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Abstract
Over the last three decades the global economy has expanded in a remarkable fashion. While nominal world 
GDP has increased four times, world bilateral trade flows have grown more than six-fold, and the stock 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown by roughly 20 times since 1980. The sources of global trade 
and investment growth are well known—general economic expansion, policy liberalization, and better 
communications and technology—but the impact of each source is unclear. In this paper we attempt to 
uncover the contribution of policy liberalization to the rising ratios of US inward and outward FDI stocks to 
GDP over the last three decades. 
The role of policy liberalization in fostering FDI expansion since the 1980s is murky. Policies related to FDI 
have undoubtedly been liberalized since the 1980s, but the changes are not easily quantified, making an 
assessment of their impact on FDI difficult. To get around this obstacle, we rely on stylized facts about US 
inward and outward FDI stocks and an unorthodox calculation method to approximate the role of policy 
liberalization on FDI growth.  
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Foreign direct investment (FDI), both into and out of the United States, has boomed over the last two 
and half decades. A certain pace of FDI growth is not surprising, since countries grow wealthier over 
time and all investment stocks expand.1 Yet the growth of US FDI stocks, both inward and outward, 
substantially exceeds this “expected” rate of growth. Over the 25-year period, between 1982 and 2006, 
US nominal GDP roughly quadrupled and US two-way merchandise trade increased more than six-fold 
in nominal terms.2 These are large increases, but they pale in comparison to the eleven-fold increase in US 
outward FDI stock and the fourteen-fold increase in US inward FDI stock (see figures 1 and 2). 
What explains this FDI boom? Conceptually it can be attributed to three broadly defined factors: 
expansion of the economy, as mentioned; policy liberalization; and everything else, a combination of 
market forces (especially the application of firm-specific advantages on a global scale) and technological 
change (notably better communications and transportation). The first factor, economic expansion, is 
roughly captured by GDP growth in the United States and abroad, allowing us to narrow our inquiry 
into the rising ratio of FDI stocks to GDP. We are primarily concerned with policy liberalization and 
its role in raising the ratio of FDI to GDP; once we make a rough accounting of the policy liberalization 
component, what’s left goes into the “everything else” or “market forces plus technology” basket.
Figuring out the role of policy liberalization in FDI expansion has become increasingly important. 
Marchick and Slaughter (2008) outline a growing protectionist sentiment toward FDI—headlined 
in the United States by the Dubai Ports World and Unocal/CNOOC debates. If the role of policy 
liberalization in FDI growth over the last 25 years has been limited, then a reversion to mild 
protectionism would not be so worrisome. But the simple calculations in this paper suggest that 
policy liberalization has been an important driver of the FDI boom and that, by implication, growing 
protectionism around the world is worrisome. 
In the next section we survey the relevant empirical literature on the role of policy liberalization in 
sparking FDI growth. We then present data, at the industry level and by destination, on US inward and 
outward FDI stocks from 1982 to 2006.3 Next, we make a series of judgments to assess the role of policy 
liberalization in augmenting direct investment. As its corollary, our approach attributes to market forces 
and technological change the residual or unexplained rise in the ratio between FDI stocks and GDP 
levels. Finally, we attempt to quantify the economic benefit of increased FDI stocks spurred by policy 
liberalization.
1. The US stock of fixed assets (valued in terms of historical acquisition cost) relative to nominal GDP was 3.6 in 1982. 
The ratio dipped to about 3.0 in the late 1990s but rose to roughly 3.4 in 2006 (Bureau of Economic Analysis).
2. Statistics are from UN COMTRADE database, International Monetary Fund, and Bureau of Economic Analysis.
3. Our “by destination” data concern only US outward FDI stocks.
Literature review
Out of the vast literature on the determinants of FDI, we focus on policy liberalization—measures such 
as the removal of explicit FDI restrictions, relaxation of capital controls, reduced tariff and nontariff 
barriers, and lower corporate taxes. Blonigen (2005) provides an extensive review of the impact of policy 
liberalization on FDI as well as other FDI determinants not discussed here. His central finding is that the 
literature still leaves a great deal to be explained. In his words, “the empirical literature…is still young 
enough that most hypotheses are still up for grabs” (Blonigen 2005). 
Most of the relevant literature takes a historical approach, analyzing past episodes of policy 
liberalization, both over time and across countries. Since the FDI policies of OECD countries (including 
the United States) are relatively nonrestrictive, empirical work has focused on policy changes in 
developing countries. Nicoletti et al. (2003) is an exception. The model designed by these authors enables 
them to forecast the effect of policy liberalization on FDI into the United States. They estimate that, if 
the United States adopted the same low level of FDI restrictions prevailing in the United Kingdom—
including screening requirements, foreign shareholding requirements, nationality of management, and 
visa limitations—the inward FDI stock in the United States would increase by approximately 20 percent.4 
The Nicoletti et al. study also speculates on the effect of completely removing individual FDI 
restrictions. The authors calculate that the average inward FDI stocks of OECD countries would have 
risen roughly 80 percent above observed levels, over the period 1980 to 2000, if foreign equity ceilings 
had been completely abolished. Other findings: If national interest tests were completely ignored, 
average OECD inward FDI stocks would have been 20 percent higher over the period, and if nationality 
requirements on management were relaxed, average OECD inward FDI stocks would have increased by 
roughly 10 percent over the period.
An older but still relevant study by Hultman and McGee (1989) examined foreign bank activity in 
the United States from 1973 to 1986 and found that inward banking growth was directly related to the 
International Banking Act of 1978, which leveled the playing field between foreign and US-owned banks. 
Shapiro and Globerman (2003) investigated the impact of several policy shifts on inward and 
outward FDI in the Canadian manufacturing, finance, and energy sectors. Their study indirectly speaks to 
the US response since the bulk of Canadian direct investment in both directions occurs with the United 
States. In the manufacturing sector, both the US-Canada Auto Pact and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) were found to positively impact Canadian inflows and outflows of FDI; however, 
the results were not robust to all specifications. The Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act (1974 
4. The analysis in Nicoletti et al. (2003) uses 1998 inward FDI stocks as the base level. The forecast applies the same FDI 
restrictiveness indicator found for the United Kingdom to the United States and other OECD countries.
to 1985), which applied a “significant benefit” threshold on new foreign investments and acquisitions, 
was found to negatively impact FDI inflows and outflows, but again the results were not robust to all 
specifications. In finance, the so-called little bang (enacted in 1987), which relaxed barriers protecting the 
Canadian securities markets, was found to have a positive impact on FDI inflows in the financial sector. A 
restrictive Canadian policy known as the National Energy Program (1980 to 1985), which limited foreign 
ownership in Canadian oil and gas industries, was associated with fewer FDI inflows into the energy 
sector. NAFTA was surprisingly found to have a negative impact on inward Canadian FDI but a positive 
impact on outward Canadian FDI in the finance sector.5 In the energy sector, NAFTA had no impact on 
FDI inflows but a positive impact on FDI outflows. 
Loree and Guisinger (1995) find predictable results when they look at the effect of developing-
country investment incentives, performance requirements, and tax rates on attracting US outward FDI. 
Investment incentives (subsidies as well as tax and tariff concessions) were found to attract US outward 
FDI. Performance requirements, which encompass export and import obligations, and local input or 
labor requirements, were found to decrease US outward FDI. The authors also found that high host-
country corporate tax rates are associated with less US outward FDI. 
Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova (1998) examined FDI flows into developing countries from 
many countries, not only from the United States, and found a similar negative impact of corporate taxes 
on FDI, but only when tax rates exceeded 20 percent. Additionally, that study evaluated an index of the 
degree of openness of developing countries to international capital as an explanatory variable for FDI 
flows. Host-country liberalization of financial restrictions was associated with larger FDI inflows. These 
results coincide with the work of Asiedu and Gyimah-Brempong (2007), who also use an  
FDI restrictiveness index. Their data are more recent and focus exclusively on US outward FDI flows  
to Africa.6
Several studies take a detailed look at the impact of capital controls on FDI. Asiedu and Lien 
(2004) analyze three types of capital controls—capital account restrictions, exchange rate distortions, 
and controls to ensure the repatriation of export proceeds—in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, across 96 
developing countries. In the most recent period (1990 to 2000), they find that removing controls on the 
repatriation of export proceeds would have increased annual FDI inflows (into developing countries) as a 
share of GDP by slightly more than 1 percent; capital account liberalization would have about the same 
effect; and a unitary exchange rate would increase the ratio by about a half percent (Asiedu and Lien 
5. The negative NAFTA impact on inward FDI might have reflected some unwinding of prior “barrier-jumping” 
investment from the United States into Canada.
6. In both Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova (1998) and Asiedu and Gyimah-Brempong (2007), annual FDI inflows 
as a ratio to GDP are used as the dependent variable. Loree and Guisinger (1995) use the absolute level of annual FDI 
inflows from the United States as the dependent variable.
2004).7 However, these are average coefficients, and the authors find a range of results depending on the 
region. For example, in East Asia the estimated effect of capital account liberalization was an increase of 
roughly 4 percent in FDI inflows as a share of GDP, while the impact of capital account liberalization 
was not significant in Latin America or the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In fact, none of the 
estimated impacts from policy liberalization are statistically significant for MENA. In Latin America, 
however, both a unitary exchange rate and a liberalization of repatriation policy would have increased the 
annual ratio of FDI flows to GDP by about 1 percent over the period. A figure of 1 percent sounds small, 
but cumulated over 20 years, it could mean an increase in the stock of inward FDI, relative to GDP, of 
20 percentage points. 
Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) also investigate the impact of capital control liberalization on FDI. 
The authors look exclusively at the foreign activities of US multinational firms from 1982 to 1997. They 
find that US multinational firm assets grew about 8 percent faster in the years following capital control 
liberalizations.8
De Mooij and Ederveen (2005) carried out a “meta-analysis” of several empirical works on the 
tax elasticity of FDI.9 The authors consider four types of empirical techniques: cross-sectional analysis, 
time-series analysis, discrete-choice models, and panel-data analysis. On average, negative elasticities are 
found for all four types, indicating that a reduction in corporate taxes increases FDI flows. De Mooij and 
Ederveen (2005) then remove the outlying observations, leaving 427 elasticity estimates across the four 
empirical techniques. After averaging the estimates of each category the authors find a semi-elasticity for 
the response of FDI to taxation of –3.72, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, a one-percentage point tax rate 
reduction (e.g., lowering a 25 percent corporate tax rate to a 24 percent corporate tax rate) would lead to 
a 3.72 percent increase in annual FDI flows. This, of course, is just an average estimate; actual responses 
will obviously vary between countries. However, for our discussion, the negative sign of the elasticity is 
important. Table 1 shows corporate tax rates of several developed countries in 1982, 1987, 1992, 1999, 
and 2005; the general downward trend is evident. Combined with a negative tax elasticity of FDI, the tax 
rate reductions explain some of the growth of FDI stocks over the last 25 years. 
7. The results for the 1970s and 1980s also show positive relationships between policy liberalization and FDI flows, but 
the results lack significance (Asiedu and Lien 2004).
8. Two earlier studies, Carlson and Hernandez (2002) and Montiel and Reinhart (1999), found that capital controls were 
actually associated with more FDI. In defense of this outcome, the authors suggest that capital controls are instrumental in 
altering the composition of capital attracted by a country, bringing more FDI in place of short-term debt but not changing 
the overall amount of capital very much.
9. De Mooij and Ederveen (2005) focus on the impact on FDI of percentage point changes in tax rates—i.e., semi-
elasticities—rather than simple elasticities. A simple elasticity would show the FDI response to a 1-percent cut in tax 
rates—e.g., lowering a 20 percent corporate tax rate to 19.8 percent. Since we normally think of tax rates in percentage 
point terms, De Mooij and Ederveen (2005) prefer the expression in semi-elasticity terms.6
Applying simple-minded arithmetic, we can quantify the impact that corporate tax rate cuts might 
have on FDI into the 18 countries listed in table 1. This is done by applying an average of national 
tax rate cuts to the –3.72 semi-elasticity estimate from De Mooij and Ederveen (2005). Following this 
approach, table 2 shows two ways to quantify the impact of corporate rate cuts on FDI. We discuss only 
the more conservative estimate here, leaving detailed discussion of the calculation method used in table 
2, as well as the bolder approach, to box 1. The conservative calculation proceeds as follows. We assume 
that corporate tax cuts boost FDI flows for about 5 years and then the stimulus dwindles away to zero. 
Therefore we divide our sample into successive 5-year periods. For each period, we calculate the impact of 
the average tax rate cut (across years and countries) on FDI inflows experienced by the 18 countries listed 
in table 1.10 We then sum up the impacts calculated for each 5-year period to estimate the total impact. 
Using this method, we estimate the impact of corporate tax rate cuts to be $315 billion or roughly 5 
percent of the total growth in inward FDI stocks for the 18 countries over the period. Box 1 provides 
further explanation.
Ferrantino and Hall (2001) develop a model to examine the direct impact of trade liberalization on 
FDI. Specifically, the authors investigate the removal of bilateral tariffs between the United States and 
the United Kingdom under two scenarios. In the first scenario, they just remove the tariffs between the 
two countries; in the second scenario, they not only eliminate bilateral tariffs but also force the United 
Kingdom to abandon its preferential tariff status with the rest of the European Union. Their analysis 
indicates that trade liberalization, due mostly to cheaper imports, generally increases FDI. However, 
for some industries in the second scenario, the loss of an export platform in the United Kingdom 
for shipments to the European Union negatively impacts FDI, despite the positive effect of tariff 
liberalization between the United States and United Kingdom (Ferrantino and Hall 2001). 
Goldar and Banga (2007) find similarly nuanced results when looking at FDI into India from 1991 
to 1998 but again reach the general conclusion that trade liberalization positively impacts FDI. Blonigen 
(2002) takes an interesting approach to the trade barrier question by looking at antidumping duties. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that, when faced with large antidumping duties, multinational firms 
will respond by increasing FDI placed in a newly blocked market—a form of tariff jumping. Blonigen 
(2002) finds a contrary result and suggests that tariff jumping is only an option for a select few firms from 
developed countries. 
Hufbauer and Schott (2007) apply a gravity model to inward FDI stocks and find limited support 
for the tariff-jumping theory. Their model, which includes dummy variables for major free trade 
10. This approach is intended to reflect the possibility that the high estimated response of FDI to lower corporate taxes (a 
coefficient of –3.72) may reflect investment diversion, which is subsequently arrested when a competing country cuts its 
own corporate tax rate.
Box 1 extending De Mooij and ederveen (2005)
In table 2 we quantify the impact of tax cuts on the combined inward FDI stock of 8 countries (listed in table 
) between 982 and 200. The methodology for table 2 is simple: We combine the semi-elasticity reported 
by De Mooij and Ederveen (200) from their meta-analysis, namely –.2, with the average cumulated tax rate 
cuts. The result is an estimate of what FDI inflows would have been in a given period without the tax cuts—i.e., 
the hypothetical level of FDI inflows. We then take the sum of differences between observed FDI inflows and 
hypothetical FDI inflows to estimate the impact of tax cuts on the combined inward FDI stock of the 8 countries 
between 982 and 200. Mathematically, our calculations can be expressed as follows:
 
In these equations, FDIhypo is the predicted amount of FDI inflows that would have occurred due to changes in 
corporate tax rates; FDIin is the observed amount of FDI inflows; ΔTaxes is the average corporate tax rate change 
for the 8 countries listed in table ; and ΔFDIstock is the total change in the observed inward FDI stock of the 8 
countries attributable to corporate tax changes between 982 and 200.
  We conduct the calculation in two alternative ways. The first method almost certainly generates an 
upper-bound estimate of the inward FDI stock change resulting from lower corporate tax rates. In this method, 
we start with the year-by-year change in the weighted average statutory corporate tax rate in the 8 countries 
(table ). We then assume that a tax cut in any year (say, 98) continues to expand OECD FDI flows for the entire 
subsequent period (i.e., 98 to 200). The result is an estimated impact of roughly $,800 billion. This is roughly 2 
percent of the observed total growth in inward FDI stocks in the 8 countries. However, the calculations in table 9 
suggest that  percent of growth in inward US FDI stock reflects forces other than simple US GDP growth. It seems 
unlikely that lower US corporate tax rates can explain nearly half of this “residual” expansion. 
  The second method, which we discuss in the main text, uses the average statutory corporate tax rate cuts 
of the 8 countries, for each of the -year periods. Total FDI flows for the full -year periods are used in this method. 
However, unlike the first method, we assume that the benefit of the tax cut only affects FDI flows in each -year 
period. Applied to US experience, the estimate from the -year analysis seems more plausible, especially in light of 
a related consideration. The meta-analysis semi-elasticity of –.2 likely captures a good deal of change in relative 
corporate tax rates between competing destinations (e.g., inward US FDI versus inward Canadian FDI). When first 
one country then another reduces its corporate tax rate, there is probably some expansion of total FDI flows, but 
there is also considerable switching between FDI destinations. Hence a transitory impact calculation, such as our 
-year approach, seems more appropriate. 
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agreements (FTAs) and customs unions, finds that the Canada-US FTA decreased bilateral FDI stocks 
between the two countries.11 This result can be cited in support of the tariff-jumping hypothesis in the 
sense that the Canada-US FTA perhaps led to an unwinding of investment that was earlier spurred 
by tariff barriers. However, the Canada-US FTA finding runs contrary to most other FTA results. For 
example, applying the same gravity model, the European Union is found to have increased FDI stocks 
between member countries over the length of the sample period, 1976 to 2005. Mercosur and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTA (AFTA) were also found to increase FDI stocks 
between their members (Hufbauer and Schott 2007).
Lesher and Miroudot (2007) investigate FTAs but restrict their analysis to agreements with 
important investment provisions. They conclude that such agreements are associated with 50 percent 
higher FDI flows between the members.12 Dee (2006) finds that the investment and cross-border service 
provisions in FTAs sponsored by large countries (including the United States) are positively related with 
inward FDI. 
Sachs and Sauvant (2009) have authored the introduction to a forthcoming volume on bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs), double taxation treaties (DTTs), and foreign direct investment. They find the 
growth in worldwide FDI flows in the past two decades coincides with a proliferation of both BITs and 
DTTs. After reviewing the literature to investigate the causal relationship, if any, between treaties and 
FDI, they find no consensus on the role of BITs in FDI promotion. A few studies—including Neumeyer 
and Spess (2005), Salacuse and Sullivan (2005), and Buthe and Milner (2008, 2009)—do find that 
BITs increased FDI flows. However, these works are contradicted by Hallward-Driemeir (2003), Aisbett 
(2007), and Yackee (2007), who report that BITs have little or no effect on FDI. Sachs and Sauvant 
(2009) suggest that these diverse findings could reflect the varying structures of different BITs, structures 
that are not distinguished in the empirical studies. As for the connection between DTTs and FDI, Sachs 
and Sauvant (2009) find a similar lack of consensus. Blonigen and Davies (2004) found that DTTs have 
an insignificant effect on US inward and outward FDI between 1980 and 1999, while Neumeyer (2006) 
reports that developing countries can increase FDI inflows by signing DTTs with capital-exporting 
developed countries.
An often overlooked FDI-policy tool over the last 25 years is the investment promotion agency 
(IPA). These agencies, which have become increasingly common, try to sell multinational companies 
11. A negative coefficient is also found for the Mexico-US FTA (i.e., the Mexican-US portion of NAFTA); however, this 
coefficient is not statistically significant.
12. Lesher and Miroudot (2007) also include bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in their analysis, but they find that the 
effect of BITs on FDI is insignificant. 9
on the advantages of investing in a particular country. Harding and Javorik (2007) and Charlton and 
Davis (2007) investigate the impact of IPAs on inward FDI flows. Both works find a strong positive 
relationship. However, it is unclear from the empirical studies whether IPAs increase the overall volume 
of FDI or merely shift it around. Indeed, Harding and Javorik (2007) find that IPAs in the same region 
can divert FDI flows from one country to another.
DataBase anaLysis
The foregoing literature review suggests that policy liberalization has exerted a positive impact on FDI 
growth but does not provide a definitive way to gauge what portion of FDI growth can be attributed to 
policy liberalization. We, therefore, draw on stylized facts—more evident when the figures for US inward 
and outward FDI stocks are disaggregated by industry—to gauge the role of policy liberalization. We also 
explore US outward FDI stock data disaggregated by destination country, to gain an alternative insight 
into the role of policy liberalization on the growth of US FDI stocks.
industry analysis
In nominal terms, US outward FDI stock grew from roughly $200 billion in 1982 to over $2.3 trillion 
in 2006. The inward stock grew from around $82 billion in 1982 to almost $1.8 trillion in 2006. Figures 
1 and 2 show that, over the 25-year period, this growth in US inward and outward FDI stocks has 
been relatively steady. Tables 3 and 8 present US outward and inward FDI stock data disaggregated by 
industry. Most industries show the strong upward trend exhibited in the overall data, but the reasons for 
growth likely vary by industry.
Technological improvements have sharply boosted FDI in several manufacturing industries. 
The computer industry, for example, has witnessed tremendous technology gains and an explosion of 
proprietary knowledge over the last 25 years. Both forces have caused the industry to expand globally. The 
US inward FDI stock in electronic and computer equipment and products grew by $64 billion over the 
period. The US outward stock grew even more—by $85 billion. General policy liberalization can explain 
only a small part of this growth. 
Policy liberalization plays a clearer role in other industries. In the case of outward FDI, policy 
liberalization has opened up several regulated industries over the past 25 years to US firms—including 
finance, communications, utilities, insurance, transportation, and banking. For inward FDI, the United 0
States has opened the same six industries, plus motor vehicle manufacturing (transportation equipment in 
our database).13
   Tables 4 and 9 contain calculations of FDI stock growth after making allowances for GDP 
growth. When accounting for US inward FDI growth (table 9) US GDP growth is used; when 
accounting for US outward FDI growth (table 4) world GDP growth is used.14 The far right column of 
both tables indicates how much of the growth in FDI stocks is left unexplained after taking GDP growth 
into account. Based on these columns, two-thirds of the growth in total US outward FDI stock, and 
three-fourths of the growth in total US inward FDI stock, remain to be explained after making allowances 
for GDP growth. 
Of these unexplained shares, what portion can be attributed to policy liberalization? Tables 4 and 
9 show FDI stock data by industry, after subtracting the presumed effect of GDP growth. From these 
calculations we can make a rough guess as to the contribution resulting from policy liberalization.
Here is how we go about making a guess based on industry data. Our approach is to apply “all-
or-nothing” arithmetic. We attribute all the “residual expansion” of FDI stocks, after accounting for 
GDP growth, in industries indentified as lead beneficiaries of policy liberalization, to that factor. These 
industries were heavily regulated by most countries 25 years ago, and several are still subject to extensive 
regulation. Using “all-or-nothing” arithmetic, it seems reasonable to attribute all the “residual expansion” 
in these industries to internal deregulation and greater openness to foreign investment. FDI in a few 
industries also suffered from policy tightening—US outward FDI in the petroleum-related industry being 
the clearest example.15 All the “residual contraction” in petroleum is scored as a negative offset, the result 
of policy deliberalization. In all other industries we attribute none of the residual expansion of FDI stocks 
to policy liberalization or policy tightening. In box 2 we explain which industries were called out to make 
our estimate of the role of policy liberalization.
To be sure, our all-or-none methodology is crude. However, there are three reasons for believing 
the methodology is more likely to underestimate, than overestimate, the impact of policy liberalization 
on FDI. First, our literature review revealed that several broad policy measures—such as the removal of 
capital controls and reduction of corporate tax rates—contributed to overall FDI growth. By restricting 
our measure of the impact of policy liberalization to a few regulated industries, we disregard the impact 
of broad policy changes on other industries. Second, we are conservative in choosing which regulated 
13. In the automotive industry, US “policy liberalization” took the form of not blocking the entry of Toyota, Nissan, and 
Honda in the 1980s, despite strident objections from US unions and some established auto firms.
14. For the US outward FDI stock calculations, “world growth” means GDP growth of all countries except the United 
States.
15. Over the past 25 years, national oil companies have seriously squeezed the “seven sisters,” in terms of control over 
petroleum reserves and production levels. 
Box 2 rationale behind selected industries
Efforts to measure FDI restrictions across industries have been limited, and very little work has been aimed at 
measuring the change in restrictions over time. Scholars have been deterred by the laborious and imprecise task of 
categorizing the restrictiveness of FDI policies. Unlike tariffs on merchandise imports, which are reported according 
to standard Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes, no such classification exists for evaluating the impact of FDI 
policies on investment flows. For example, it is hard to judge how much investment is deterred by a policy that 
requires a majority of the board of directors to be nationals of the FDI host country. 
  Brushing these conceptual difficulties aside, we draw on the work of Stephen Golub (200) to identify 
the industries where policy liberalization has had a significant impact on the expansion of US outward FDI. His 
index figures are plagued with the same problems that visit any effort to measure FDI restrictions, but his work has 
the advantage of covering several industries over time and across countries. This allows us to identify countries 
and industries where restrictions were materially eased over the last 2 years. Golub’s method for classifying 
the restrictiveness of FDI policies, based on the earlier work of Hardin and Holmes (99), is shown in table . To 
calculate the index for a specific industry, Golub (200) combines country-specific General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) commitments and OECD commitments with various official (e.g., US Trade Representative) and 
corporate sources (e.g., PriceWaterhouseCoopers). Golub’s index ranges between zero and one, with an index score 
of one indicating the most restrictive FDI policies. 
  Table 6 shows the average FDI restrictiveness indexes for 20 OECD countries, in selected years between 
98 and 200, for several industries. Restrictions have been significantly eased on telecommunications, finance 
(both insurance and banking), electric utilities, and transportation. Restrictions have been eased only slightly for 
business services, construction, distribution, tourism, and manufacturing. These changes inform our selection of 
industries where policy liberalization positively affected US outward FDI; table  lists the industries in question. We 
list the petroleum industry as an industry where policy changes had a negative effect on US outward FDI. Golub did 
not cover the petroleum industry, but measures taken by various national oil companies against the “seven sister” 
oil companies were severe over the past 2 years.
  While Golub’s dataset covers the United States, his indexes show little change in US restrictiveness 
between 98 and 200. This is mostly because explicit US FDI policies—the ones covered in Golub’s indexes—
have not changed much since 98. However, drastic policy and regulatory changes—like the Bell Telephone 
break up or electric utility deregulation—have taken place in a few US industries. In our opinion, these changes 
have exerted a positive influence on FDI to the United States since 982. 
  Table 0 lists the affected industries. Transportation equipment is included because the US government 
basically changed course in the 980s and permitted large-scale investment by Japanese automakers. Banking, 
finance, and insurance are included because of various legislative acts that liberalized the financial sector, most 
notably the Foreign Bank Supervision and Enhancement Act of 99 and the Financial Services Modernization Act 
of 999 (Tschoegl 200). Utilities are included largely because of the reforms under the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 98 and the Energy Policy Act of 992 (NRC 200). The communications industry is included 
because of the Bell Telephone divestiture, effective in 98, and the reforms under the Telecommunications Act 
of 996 (AT&T Corporation 2008, FCC 200). Transportation is included because of the various deregulations that 
occurred in the 980s, most notably the Aviation Deregulation Act of 98, the Motor Carrier Act of 980, the 
Staggers Rail Act of 980, and the Ocean Shipping Act of 98 (US Department of Transportation 200). The full 
effect of these transportation deregulations were not fully realized until after the first year of our analysis, 982.     2
industries might have benefited from policy liberalization. For example, we do not consider the growth 
of FDI stocks in the wide-ranging “industry” known as “Holding Companies” to be driven by policy 
liberalization, despite its close link to the finance sector.16 Third, when accounting for GDP growth 
we disregard the endogenous relationship between GDP and policy liberalization. Policy liberalization 
(independent of any expansion in FDI) has undoubtedly contributed to GDP gains over the past 25 
years; by ignoring this aspect of the policy picture we slightly underestimate the role of policy in FDI 
growth.17
Tables 7 and 10 show our calculations of the role of policy liberalization. The method behind both 
tables starts with the 1982 FDI stock and the appropriate GDP growth over a span of 25 years (either US 
or world growth) to arrive at a predicted 2006 FDI stock. The predicted 2006 stock level is subtracted 
from the actual 2006 FDI stock to determine what portion of FDI stock growth is not explained by GDP 
growth—i.e., the “residual expansion” of the FDI stock. The same method is followed in tables 4 and 
9. The “residual expansion” of FDI stocks in the identified industries is then added up and expressed as 
a share of total “unexplained” FDI growth to estimate the impact of policy liberalization (the last two 
columns in tables 7 and 10). 
Table 7 shows our guesses as to the role of policy changes in US outward FDI stock growth over 
the last 25 years. According to these judgmental estimates, roughly 27 percent of the unexplained US 
outward FDI stock growth can be attributed to policy liberalization. Table 10 shows the corresponding 
guesses for US inward FDI stock. Here the judgmental estimate of policy liberalization is larger, roughly 
39 percent of the unexplained inward FDI stock growth. “Everything else” or “market forces plus 
technology” accounts for the remaining unexplained shares of US outward FDI stock growth (73 percent) 
and of US inward FDI stock growth (61 percent). The role of financial deregulation in the United States 
and abroad has been dramatic both for US and foreign firms. In dollar terms, the calculated impact of 
policy changes on all US inward FDI, roughly $500 billion, exceeds the calculated impact on US outward 
FDI, $385 billion. A major reason for the difference is the negative impact of nationalistic forces abroad 
on US petroleum investment.
16. From 1982 to 2006, the “residual expansion” (after accounting for GDP growth) of US outward FDI in the BEA 
category “Holding Companies” was $619 billion. If all of this growth was added to our estimate, the role of policy 
liberalization in increasing total US outward FDI stock would more than double. Even if we just attributed half the 
increase in outward FDI of holding companies ($310 billion) to policy liberalization, that would increase our estimate 
of the overall impact of policy liberalization on US outward FDI by over 60 percent. The residual expansion of the US 
inward FDI stock in the Holding Company industry was $73 billion over the period. Attributing this growth to policy 
liberalization would also enlarge our estimates. 
17. One factor that we do not consider, which may inflate our estimates, is the role of the stock market. Mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) make up a large portion of US FDI flows (both inward and outward), and they are closely tied to 
stock market fluctuations. In fact, the correlation between the annual New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) composite price 
index and annual US M&A purchases (a component of outward FDI) between 1987 and 2006 was 0.95. The correlation 
between the same NYSE composite price index and US M&A sales (a component of inward FDI) was 0.70. 
Expressed as a share of total inward and outward FDI stock growth (not just the “residual 
expansion”), world GDP growth accounted for roughly 35 percent of US outward FDI stock growth, and 
US GDP growth accounted for roughly 23 percent of US inward FDI stock growth. Policy liberalization, 
under our calculations, accounted for roughly 18 percent of US outward FDI stock growth and 30 
percent of US inward FDI stock growth. The “everything else” or “technology” category, accounted for 
roughly 48 percent of US outward FDI stock growth and roughly 47 percent of US inward FDI stock 
growth.18
industry analysis—5-year averages
We carried out additional calculations to gauge the impact of policy liberalization on average annual 
FDI stocks over five 5-year intervals during the last 25 years, and the results are shown in table 11. Table 
11 uses the same method and industries as tables 5 and 8 but only summarizes the final results. The 
calculations suggest that the bulk of FDI stock growth attributable to policy changes occurred in the 
1990s. As documented by Sachs and Sauvant (2009), the proliferation of BITs and DTTs in recent years 
could be a possible explanation for this pattern, at least so far as outward FDI is concerned. As of 2006, 
over 2,500 BITs had been signed worldwide, up from just under 500 in 1990 (Sachs and Sauvant 2009).
Country analysis
To supplement the industry analysis, and provide an alternative view of the role of policy liberalization, 
we investigated US outward FDI stocks disaggregated by destination country. Since US inward 
investment policy does not usually discriminate by origin country, in this exercise we ignore growth in 
US inward FDI. Table 12 shows US outward FDI stocks to major US destination countries, with minor 
countries grouped by region.19 The US outward FDI stock in most countries has increased substantially 
over the period. The reasons for the growth likely vary by destination country, with policy changes often 
a major factor. Some countries, like the United Kingdom and Germany, have practiced liberal policies 
toward inward FDI for decades, while others like China, India, and Japan have just begun to open their 
doors to foreign investment. Parallel to the industry analysis, we examine the “residual expansion” in 
FDI, after making allowances for GDP growth, in countries deemed to have implemented major policy 
changes over the last 25 years, to guess the magnitude of policy liberalization on FDI. 
18. In dollar terms, the estimated impact of “market forces plus technology” on outward FDI stock, about $1 trillion, 
exceeds their impact on inward FDI stock, about $800 billion.
19. The total FDI stock in table 12 differs slightly from the total FDI stock in table 3. The discrepancy reflects the use of 
extrapolation methods to fill in missing data points in a few industries in the industry database. Individually indentified 
countries in table 12 accounted for roughly 97 percent of the total US outward FDI stock in 2006.
Table 13 provides growth calculations for US outward FDI stocks by destination country. Each 
destination country’s GDP growth is used for the calculations, except for a few Caribbean island 
nations (e.g., the Bahamas and Bermuda) where world GDP growth is used.20 The calculation method is 
identical to the method used in tables 4 and 9. Most countries have a positive amount of FDI growth left 
unexplained after making allowances for GDP growth. A few have a negative amount, meaning growth 
in the US outward FDI stock with the country in question did not meet growth expectations. In a few 
countries the reason for the limited FDI growth is probably policy related, but in others, like Panama, it 
is likely due to limited investment opportunities. 
Table 14 shows estimates of the role of policy changes in US outward FDI stock growth based on 
the country destination analysis. In the table, several Asian nations are included because they have become 
relatively more open to US investment over the last 25 years. Ireland is included because of its major 
tax overhaul, which made the country very friendly to inward FDI. Russia and a few Eastern European 
nations are included owing to the fall of communism. Several Caribbean island nations are included 
because they reformed their tax codes and regulatory environments to promote financial-sector FDI. 
Central and South American nations, like Chile, Argentina, and Mexico, are included because of the 
economic reforms they undertook during the 25-year period. Brazil, Peru, and other Central American 
nations are listed on the negative side because they have historically impeded inward FDI flows. In box 3 
we provide a more indepth explanation for the countries selected to make our estimate of the role of policy 
liberalization.
In aggregate terms, the results shown in table 14 are remarkably similar to the results in table 7, 
which reports the corresponding analysis by industry. The total policy impact is larger according to the 
country analysis ($434 billion) than the industry analysis ($385 billion), but the difference largely reflects 
the negative impact of policy changes in the petroleum sector. (Nationalistic petroleum policies are 
somewhat masked in the country analysis.) However, in both analyses the role of policy liberalization in 
explaining the share of “residual” FDI growth, after making allowances for GDP growth, is roughly 25 
to 30 percent. By implication, the share of “residual growth attributable to “everything else”—“market 
forces plus technology”—is 70 to 75 percent.
In terms of parsing the total US outward FDI stock growth, the country destination estimates 
indicate that GDP growth explains roughly 35 percent of the total FDI stock growth; policy liberalization 
explains another 20 percent; and “everything else” or “market forces plus technology” explains 45 percent 
of the total growth. 
20. For these Caribbean islands, most FDI is in the financial sector; consequently, FDI in these islands is essentially 
influenced by world GDP growth rather than home-nation GDP growth.
Table 17 summarizes our estimates of the impact of policy liberalization on US outward FDI 
stock viewed from both the country and the industry approaches, using 5-year averages of FDI stock 
and GDP data. Like the full-period analysis, the temporal patterns are remarkably similar: On a 5-year 
basis, the shares of unexplained FDI growth explained by policy liberalization are roughly the same. Most 
FDI growth from policy liberalization appears to come in more recent periods, in both the country and 
industry analyses. 
Benefit of fDi Growth
Graham and Krugman (1995) identified two broadly defined avenues through which an economy can 
benefit from inward FDI: increased international integration and external economies (spillover effects). 
Increased integration comes from the impact of FDI on trade in goods, services, and knowledge (e.g., 
Box 3 rationale behind selected countries
To identify the countries where policy liberalization has had a significant impact on the expansion of US outward 
FDI, we draw on two sources: an FDI restrictiveness index developed by Agosin and Machado (200) and a dataset 
of FDI policy changes compiled by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). We 
do not use the work of Stephen Golub, because his time-series data focused on OECD countries, while most 
liberalization over the last 2 years has taken place in developing countries. 
  Agosin and Machado (200) use data from the International Monetary Fund’s Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions Annual Report to create their index of FDI restrictions. Their index ranges between zero 
and five, with an index score of zero indicating maximum restrictiveness. Their index reflects the follow policies: 
nonautomatic registration and approval, sector restrictions, restrictions in the percentage of ownership allowed, 
and controls on the repatriation of capital. Table  contains Agosin and Machado’s index for  countries in 
990, 996, and 2002. Most countries indicate an easing of restrictions over the period. The trend of liberalization 
displayed in table  informs our selection of countries where policy liberalization has had a significant impact of 
US outward FDI; table  lists these countries.
  Since 992, UNCTAD has kept track of FDI policy changes in 9 countries. The UNCTAD data are broad 
but not very deep: Policy changes are only recorded as “more favorable” or “less favorable” to investment. Table 
6 shows the UNCTAD data. Overall, since 992, more favorable policy changes outnumbered less favorable 
changes by almost 2,000 episodes. The countries listed in table —countries where we believe policy changes 
had a significant impact on US outward FDI—are loosely those countries with numerous positive policy changes, 
as recorded by UNCTAD. A few countries with a substantial amount of more favorable policy changes—e.g., 
Vietnam—are not included in table  because the US FDI stock in 2006 was small (i.e., less than $00 million). A 
few countries with a small number of positive policy changes are, however, included in table  because the policy 
changes were significant—e.g., the end of Soviet rule or the substantial market reform exhibited in Ireland or 
Argentina.6
headquarters coordination). External economies usually take the form of technological spillovers that 
occur when domestic firms imitate the best practices of foreign firms. In our effort to quantify the 
benefit of US inward FDI stock growth, and ultimately the role of policy liberalization, we only consider 
technological spillovers. Increased integration is an important benefit of US inward FDI, but as Graham 
and Krugman (1995) put it, “inward FDI may be expected to bring gains from integration that are 
qualitatively similar to the conventional gains from trade, but the magnitude of these gains is anyone’s 
guess.” In a companion analysis, we make such a guess but under the heading of benefits from expanded 
trade.21 This evaluation of technological spillovers only gauges the role of FDI in providing a one-time 
shock to economic growth via improvements in productivity. Box 4 explores the role of FDI in boosting 
the long-term rate of economic growth, principally a developing-country phenomenon. 
In an effort to quantify the benefit of US outward FDI growth, and the role of policy liberalization, 
we rely on a relatively simple measure: the income received by US firms from their direct investments 
abroad. Since this measure does not speak to either of the avenues proposed by Graham and Krugman 
(1995), we believe that the calculation represents a low-end estimate of the economic benefit to the 
United States from US outward FDI. In the next two sections, we tackle benefits from US inward and 
outward FDI growth separately.
inward fDi
To assess the impact of inward FDI stock growth on US economic growth, we consider only 
technological spillovers. Consequently, our analysis probably underestimates the payoff because the 
impact of inward FDI on economic integration is ignored. However, as mentioned, in companion 
studies, we evaluate the benefits of rising trade densities on economic output, and these estimates capture, 
among other forces, much of the impact of inward FDI on economic integration. 
   Private GDP in the United States over the period 1982 to 2006 grew about 130 percent in real 
terms or about $5,300 billion (using 2000 dollars). As Graham and Krugman (1995) observed, a portion 
of this growth should be attributed to US policy liberalization, which in turn attracted inward FDI. A 
principal avenue for inward FDI to enhance GDP is through the technology spillovers attributable to the 
activities of foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs). “Spillover” is a nice word for saying that sharp 
competition from innovative foreign companies motivates US firms, through a combination of fear and 
greed, to emulate the best practices from abroad and step up their own productivity. 
In a pioneering study, Keller and Yeaple (2005) estimated the impact of US inward manufacturing 
FDI on US manufacturing-sector productivity growth between 1987 and 1996. To gauge the role 
21. Our methods for evaluating gains from trade expansion are spelled out in Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer (2006). 
of inward FDI in productivity growth—i.e., the spillover effect—the authors applied a sophisticated 
econometric technique to microeconomic data (1,277 US-owned firms) to relate firm-specific 
productivity growth to the rising share of employment by foreign firms in each firm’s industry. They 
conclude that approximately 11 percent of US manufacturing productivity growth, between 1987 and 
1996, could be attributed to US inward FDI in the manufacturing sector overall.
The Keller and Yeaple (2005) estimate can be extrapolated to produce a “ballpark” estimate of 
the expansion of total US inward FDI on US GDP growth over the longer period, 1982 to 2006. 
This exercise entails considerable guesswork because Keller and Yeaple (2005) examined only the 
manufacturing sector. Much of the growth of inward FDI took place in other sectors, finance being 
prominent.22
22. Since Keller and Yeaple (2005) only look at productivity spillovers within a given industry, their estimates do not 
include the impact of inward FDI across industries (i.e., vertical spillovers). In this regard, by using the Keller and Yeaple 
coefficient (0.516), we may underestimate the impact of inward FDI on US productivity growth. 
Box 4 openness to fDi and economic growth
Many scholars have conducted empirical research on the impact of openness to FDI on economic growth rates. 
The studies typically apply cross-sectional or panel-data analysis to a large set of countries, using standard control 
variables (e.g., inflation and trade openness) coupled with some type of FDI openness measure. Developing 
countries are the predominant subjects, but some of the studies add industrial countries to the mix. 
Cline (2008) surveys the relevant FDI literature in a paper looking more broadly at financial globalization. He 
reports evidence that openness to FDI boosts economic growth in developing countries, but the connection is not 
conclusive for developed countries. 
  In an earlier study, Balasbramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford (996) found a positive link between growth 
and FDI but only for countries with open trade regimes. Borensztein, de Gregorio, and Lee (998) find coefficients 
that are not significant for the link between FDI openness and economic growth. However, the same authors 
report that the interaction term between FDI and human capital is positively related to economic growth. They 
suggest that this finding supports the “technological spillover” thesis for FDI and economic growth. 
Haveman, Lei, and Netz (200) find a large impact of FDI on growth. Their analysis suggests that, for the average 
country in a set of both developing and developed countries, increasing FDI inflows from 2 percent of GDP to  
percent of GDP will increase the annual growth rate by  percentage point. 
  By contrast, Choe (200) and Carkovic and Levine (200), using a similar approach as earlier studies but 
covering a wider spectrum of countries, find no definitive link between FDI and economic growth. Investigating 
the discrepancy between the two studies just cited and earlier works, Blonigen and Wang (200) contend that the 
main reason is country coverage. The earlier studies (Balasbramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford 996; Borensztein, de 
Gregorio, and Lee 998) did not include developed countries, while the later studies do. Blonigen and Wang (200) 
then replicate the analysis of earlier works, updating country coverage where necessary and splitting countries 
into developing and developed groups. In this exercise, they find a significant link between FDI into developing 
countries and economic growth but no significant link in developed countries.8
The 11 percent estimate by Keller and Yeaple (2005) rests on the estimated coefficients of the 
variables used to gauge the FDI-spillover effect of foreign MNEs. The authors find a positive impact 
(coefficient of 0.213) for the increase in the share of foreign employment in firm i’s industry in the 
current year on firm i’s productivity growth for the year. They find a similar impact (coefficient of 0.303) 
for the increase in the share of foreign employment in firm i’s industry in the previous year—i.e., a one-
year lag—on firm i’s productivity growth in the current year. Keller and Yeaple (2005) also test for a 
two-year lag effect and report a coefficient that is negative but insignificant. The authors conclude that the 
total impact of foreign employment in a firm’s industry on that specific firm’s total factor productivity 
(TFP) can be summarized by a coefficient of 0.516 (0.203+0.313). The 0.516 coefficient says that if 
foreign employment in a firm’s industry increased by 10 percentage points (e.g., from 0.15 to 0.25), that 
firm’s productivity would increase by 0.516 times 10 percent or 0.0516 (i.e., 5.2 percent). 
Keller and Yeaple (2005) use the 0.516 coefficient to estimate the impact of inward FDI on 
productivity growth in US manufacturing over the length of their sample (1987 to 1996). They multiply 
0.516 times the percentage-point increase in foreign employment in US manufacturing between 1987 
and 1996 (4 percentage points) divided by the average TFP increase among the 1,277 US manufacturing 
firms in their sample (19 percent). From this calculation (namely 0.516*0.04/0.19) the authors conclude 
that roughly 11 percent of the growth in US manufacturing productivity between 1987 and 1996 can be 
explained by the spillover effect from inward FDI. 
We extend Keller and Yeaple’s (2005) analysis to the whole economy and to a longer time period 
in order to estimate the gain from policy-induced US inward FDI growth over the last 25 years. First, 
we apply the 0.516 coefficient, estimated from the experience in US manufacturing, to the whole private 
US economy.23 Second, we replace their productivity growth estimate (namely 19 percent for the average 
manufacturing firm between 1987 and 1996) with an estimate of TFP growth for the entire economy 
between 1982 and 2006 (namely 30 percent).24 Third, we replace their “change in foreign employment” in 
US manufacturing (namely 4 percentage points) with a broader figure: the change in the share of foreign 
employment in the whole private US economy between 1982 and 2005 (namely 1.24 percentage points).25 
23. This is a bold extrapolation, but many of the avenues for technological spillovers in the manufacturing sector are 
present in other private sectors as well. Keller and Yeaple (2005) conjecture that, within manufacturing, spillovers are more 
likely in industries that develop proprietary knowledge, and proprietary knowledge is certainly prominent in advanced 
service industries. Keller and Yeaple (2005) report that the estimated spillover effect is significant in manufacturing 
industries with high R&D intensity but insignificant in industries with low R&D intensity.
24. Based on OECD (2008), since US TFP data were available only from 1985 through 2006, we use the average growth 
rate over this period to obtain a TFP growth figure between 1982 and 2006. The source refers to total factor productivity 
as multifactor productivity. 
25. We use nonbank foreign affiliate data for 1982 and 2005, bank foreign affiliate data for 1980 and 2002, and total 
US private employment figures for 1982 and 2005. Bank foreign affiliate data are collected by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis only during their benchmark surveys, which are completed about every 5 years. Using these figures we find the 9
Using these figures we can apply Keller and Yeaple’s (2005) approach to calculate benefits for the 
full 25-year period and whole private US economy. The resulting estimate is that approximately 2.14 
percent of the increase in US TFP between 1982 and 2006 can be explained by the total increase in US 
inward FDI. The calculation is: 0.516*0.0124/0.30 = 0.0214.
Earlier we calculated that roughly $500 billion of the increase in US inward FDI stock between 
1982 and 2006 could be attributed to policy changes, or about 30 percent of the total growth in the 
inward FDI stock ($1,660 billion).26 Applying this share, we conclude that approximately two-thirds of 1 
percent (0.30*2.14 = 0.64 percent) of the increase in US TFP over the last 25 years can be explained by 
the growth of US inward FDI induced by US policy liberalization (stated more fully, (0.516*(0.0124*0.3
0))/0.30 = 0.0064).27 
US real private GDP in 2006 was approximately $9,338 billion. In the absence of the 30 percent 
increase in TFP observed over the last 25 years, US private GDP would presumably be 30 percent lower, 
or roughly $7,186 billion. In other words, a GDP gain of $2,152 billion can be attributed to TFP growth 
over the past 25 years.28 Applying the 2.14 percent estimate cited earlier, we conclude that, in 2006 an 
annual TFP gain of about $46 billion can be attributed to the growth over 25 years in US inward FDI 
stock (calculated as 0.0214*$2,152 billion). 
The share of this $46 billion figure attributable to policy liberalization is about 30 percent, or 
roughly $14 billion annually. According to our earlier calculations, the share attributable to the expected 
rate of FDI growth (as measured by US GDP growth) is about 23 percent, or roughly $11 billion,29 and 
the share attributable to “everything else” or “market forces plus technology” is roughly 47 percent, or 
$22 billion annually.
share of foreign employment (by majority-owned foreign firms) in the whole private US economy was about 4.67 percent 
in 2005, up from 3.43 percent in 1982.
26.  The similarity between the figure for US TFP growth between 1982 and 2006 and the figure for the portion of US 
inward FDI stock growth attributable to policy changes is coincidental. The productivity growth figure is 29.95 percent 
and the policy share figure is 30.24 percent; we present both as 30 percent in the discussion. 
27. The corresponding impact attributable to “technology” is roughly 1.01 percent. This comes from our earlier calculation 
that “technology” accounted for $784 billion of the $1,660 billion (47 percent) gained in US inward FDI stock between 
1982 and 2006. Stated more fully, the “technology” calculation is: 0.516*(0.0124*0.42))/0.30 = 1.01.
28. Assuming full employment, the increase in US TFP over the last 25 years is fully reflected in US GDP growth over the 
period.
29. We acknowledge that attributing a gain to US GDP from the growth in inward FDI stock that was predicted by 
US GDP growth has a circular quality. Bear in mind, however, that we use US GDP growth between 1982 and 2006 to 
predict the expected FDI stock in 2006. In turn, that expansion in FDI is calculated to raise the GDP level by $11 billion 
annually in 2006 and subsequent years.20
The foregoing calculations generate a minimalist estimate of the benefits to the US economy from 
inward FDI. In this paper, we do not attempt to offer a comprehensive estimate, but it is worth noting 
three benefits channels that are overlooked:
n  Inward FDI adds to the private US capital stock, and more capital per employee 
generates higher compensation per employee.30
n  Inward FDI reinforces US trade links with the global economy, and more intense trade 
boosts productivity and lowers prices (Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer 2006).
n  Foreign multinationals operating in the United States have a record of paying better 
wages and conducting more R&D than US firms in the same industry (Graham and 
Krugman 1995).
outward fDi
In terms of outward FDI, the spillover effects previously described mainly accrue to FDI host countries, 
so the type of analysis used to determine the impact of US inward FDI does not seem applicable. To be 
sure, an argument can be made that US firms increase their own productivity inside the United States 
by discovering new ways of doing business from their operations abroad. Moreover, it seems likely that 
outward FDI improves US supply chains with the world economy, stimulating both US imports and 
exports. For present purposes, however, we ignore these positive effects, but some of them are captured 
in our companion analysis of trade benefits.31 In this exercise we rely on a relatively basic figure of the 
benefits of outward FDI, namely, income receipts to US-based multinational firms. This approach 
generates a low-end estimate of the benefits to the United States from policy-induced growth in US 
outward FDI. 
For the purpose of these calculations we acknowledge that, if US outward FDI stock had been 
invested domestically, the US economy might benefit from a larger capital stock.32 However, this benefit 
would not include the “extra” profits from FDI—namely, the payoff from application of firm-specific 
know-how to new foreign markets (usually through mergers and acquisitions). The “extra” profits show 
up in various forms, including retained earnings, dividends, interest, royalties, and fees.33 To account 
for the forgone returns if the entire US outward FDI stock had been invested in the United States, we 
subtract from FDI income receipts the income that might have been earned had the outward FDI stock 
30. This is a standard result from modeling the US economy with Cobb-Douglas or CES production functions.
31. Our methods for evaluating gains from trade expansion are spelled out in Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer (2006). 
32. Work by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005) suggests that outward FDI by US firms may actually complement domestic 
investment rather than displace it. However, to be cautious we still take domestic stock displacement into consideration.
33. It is doubtful that this way of looking at outward FDI will allay the concerns of the AFL-CIO, Lou Dobbs, and other 
opponents of MNE operations, who assert that when US firms move their operations abroad instead of investing in the 
United States, the result is to stifle US economic growth.2
in a given year been invested at the prevailing US Treasury bill rates. The rationale for the approach flows 
from the underlying motivation for overseas investment. Experts on direct investment generally subscribe 
to the thesis, first proposed by Hymer (1976), that the driving force for firms to expand abroad is to apply 
firm-specific skills or technology to a wide market, not to reallocate the world’s capital. In 2006, about 79 
percent of US outward FDI flows took the form of mergers and acquisitions, while roughly 21 percent 
was new or “greenfield” investments (UNCTAD 2008a). These proportions suggest that a large portion 
of US outward FDI responds to opportunities to brighten the performance of acquired firms abroad, not 
a decision to escape the United States.34
We attribute income flows on outward FDI, minus forgone returns evaluated at the Treasury bill 
rate, as a benefit to the US economy. The calculation is carried out in table 18. This money would not 
have been earned in the absence of foreign investment by US-based MNEs. Table 18 shows US income 
receipts from US outward FDI between 1982 and 2006. Income receipts (expressed in current dollars) 
have expanded roughly ten-fold over the last 25 years, up from below 1 percent of US GDP in 1982 to 
above 2 percent in 2006. Table 18 also shows our estimates of the forgone returns from placing capital 
stock abroad rather than in the United States. The calculation applies the US one-year Treasury bill rate 
to the whole US outward FDI stock on a year-by-year basis. A simple rationale for this calculation can be 
expressed as follows: US outward FDI is indirectly financed by inward flows of portfolio capital; at the 
margin, these inward flows earn the Treasury bill rate.
Between 1982 and 2006, US income receipts from FDI, less the forgone returns on the outward 
capital stock, grew by $188 billion. We take this figure to show a conservative estimate of the benefit of 
the expansion in outward FDI. Earlier we determined that roughly 18 percent of the growth in outward 
FDI can be explained by policy liberalization abroad. Consequently we assume that policy liberalization 
created roughly 18 percent of the growth in US income receipts from FDI. Since the total dollar amount 
of growth in inward receipts was $188 billion, our arithmetic leads to the conclusion that US outward 
FDI stock growth attributable to policy liberalization contributed roughly $34 billion to US GDP in 
2006 (0.18*$188 billion). Our earlier calculations suggest that about 35 percent of the $188 billion gain, 
or roughly $66 billion, is attributable to world GDP growth, and 48 percent of the $188 billion gain, or 
roughly $90 billion, is attributable to “everything else” or “market forces plus technology.”35 
34. Over the past 25 years, the United States has been a persistent importer, not exporter of capital. The year 1985 was 
the last year when US-owned assets abroad totaled more than foreign-owned assets in the United States. Since 1985, the 
difference between the two figures has widened on a book value basis. At the end of 2006, foreign-owned assets in the 
United States were worth roughly $16.3 trillion, while US-owned assets abroad were worth roughly $13.8 trillion. With 
direct investment valued at market levels, in 2006 the value of foreign-owned assets in the United States was roughly $17.4 
trillion and US-owned assets abroad were worth roughly $15.3 trillion (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008).
35. These figures do not sum to $188 billion because of rounding.22
suMMinG up
Table 19 summarizes our results from the foregoing analysis. Earlier, using stylized facts from FDI data 
disaggregated by industry, we determined that roughly 30 percent of US inward FDI stock growth 
and 18 percent of US outward FDI stock growth between 1982 and 2006 can be attributed to policy 
liberalization. These policy-impact estimates reflect an allowance for the expected rate of FDI growth, 
as determined by GDP growth. After identifying the share of FDI stock growth caused by these two 
factors, our estimates suggest that about half of the growth in US inward and outward FDI stocks can be 
explained by what we call “everything else”—a combination of market forces and technological change. 
Using these FDI stock estimates, we went on to assess the benefits to the United States, measured 
by GDP gains, from each of the three sources of FDI growth. We estimate that, in total, and as a 
conservative measure, US inward and outward FDI stock growth between 1982 and 2006 contributed 
roughly $234 billion annually to the level of US real GDP in 2006. Of the total $234 billion annual 
gain, roughly $77 billion results from the expected rate of FDI stock growth (as a simple consequence 
of GDP growth); $48 billion is attributable to FDI stock growth from policy liberalization; and $112 
billion is attributable to FDI stock growth from “everything else”—a combination of market forces and 
technological change.36
36. These figures do not sum to $234 billion because of rounding.2
appenDix 
Data sources and notes
US inward foreign direct investment: BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis). 2008. Operations of 
Multinational Companies, “Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: Selected Tables.”
Available at www.bea.gov (accessed April 16, 2008). 
US outward foreign direct investment: BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis). 2008. Operations of 
Multinational Companies, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Selected Tables.”
Available at www.bea.gov (accessed April 16, 2008).
Notes: For the BEA FDI data disaggregated by industry, coding breaks occurred between the following 
years: 1988–89, 1993–94, 1998–99, and 2000–2001. To produce a full dataset with the BEA data a 
concordance between industries was created and implemented by hand across the coding breaks.
For the BEA FDI data disaggregated by industry and by country, many data points are omitted due 
to disclosure requirements. To produce a full dataset we extrapolate from the surrounding industry or 
country data points.
US GDP data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. GDP data of other countries comes from 
the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook.
FDI data used in tables 1 and 2: UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 
2008. FDI Statistics, “Interactive Data: FDI Flows and Stocks.” Available at www.unctad.org (accessed 
April 16, 2008).
Mergers and acquisitions data: UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 
2008. FDI Statistics, “Interactive Data: Mergers and Acquisitions.” Available at www.unctad.org 
(accessed April 16, 2008).
FDI restrictiveness data across industries comes from directly from Stephen S. Golub. The basic data are 
available in Golub (2003), but the detailed data was obtained directly from the author.
Foreign nonbank affiliate employment data: BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis). 2008. Operations of 
Multinational Companies, “Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: Selected Tables.” Available at www.
bea.gov (accessed April 16, 2008).
Foreign bank affiliate employment 2002 data: BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis). 2002. Foreign 
Direct Investment in the United States: Revised Financial and Operating Data from the 2002 Benchmark 
Survey. Available at www.bea.gov (accessed April 16, 2008).2
Foreign bank affiliate employment 1980 data: BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis). 1980. Foreign 
Direct Investment in the United States, 1980. Washington: US Department of Commerce. 
Notes: We use nonbank foreign affiliate employment data for 1982 and 2005, bank foreign affiliate 
employment data for 1980 and 2002, and total US private employment figures for 1982 and 2005. Bank 
foreign affiliate data are collected only by the Bureau of Economic Analysis during their benchmark 
surveys, which are completed about every five years.
US private employment data: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 2008. Economic Data. “Series: 
USPRIV: All Employees: Total Private Industries.” Available at http://research.stlouisfed.org (accessed 
April 16, 2008).
New York Stock Exchange data used to make the calculations discussed in footnote 18 is from www.
nyse.com (accessed July 15, 2008).
Interest rate data: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2008. “Selected Interest Rates: 
Treasury constant maturity, 1-year, annual.” Available at http://federalreserve.gov (accessed April 16, 
2008). 
Tax data: Klemm, Alexander. 2005. Corporate Tax Rate Data. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Available at www.ifs.org.uk (accessed April 14, 2008).
Total factor productivity (TFP) data: OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development). 2008. OECD Stat Extracts, “Productivity: Multi-Factor Productivity.” The database is 
available at http://stats.oecd.org (accessed April 16, 2008). 
Notes: US TFP data were only available from 1985 to 2006; we use the average growth rate over this 
period to obtain a total factor productivity growth figure between 1982 and 2006. The source refers to 
total factor productivity as multifactor productivity.2
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figure 1  indexes of us outward fDi stock, us GDp, and us two-way trade, 1982–2006  
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figure 2  indexes of us inward fDi stock, us GDp, and us two-way trade, 1982–2006 
  (1982 = 100)
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table 1     statutory corporate tax rates, selected countries, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1999, 2005 (percent)
 Country  1982  1987  1992  1999  2005
Australia  0  0  9  6  0
Austria  6  6  9    2
Canada    2  8  6  6
Finland  60  0  6  28  26
France  0      0  
Germany  62  6  9  2  8
Greece      0  0  2
Ireland  0  0  0  0  
Italy  9  6  8    
Japan          0
Netherlands  8  2      2
Norway      28  28  28
Portugal    6  0    28
Spain          
Sweden  60  2  0  28  28
Switzerland          
United Kingdom  2      0  0
United States  0  8  8  9  9
Weighted average  
   (share of FDI inflows)  9  0  6    
Notes: All figures include federal, state, and local tax rates.
Sources: Klemm (200); UNCTAD FDI database, 2008. 

table 2     the benefit to fDi stock from tax cuts, selected countries, 1982–2005











































982 8.89 0. 0 0 0
98–8 8.2 8 98 8.92 0.   0
98 .9 –0.8 9  
98 .06 –.2 0 8 2
986 6.62 –2.6 69 6 
98 0.0 –8. 2 8 2
986–90 0. –.88 62  9 988 8.9 –9.8 26 92 
989 8.9 –9.8  2 
990 .6 –.  08 
99 6.6 –2.02 9 66 29
992 .82 –2.96 92 62 0
99–9 6.0 –. 6 0  99 6.6 –2.  8 
99 6.86 –.92 2 86 8
99 . –. 86  
996 . –.62 206  62
99 .88 –0.90 2 9 
996–
2000
.6 0.66 2,80 2,6 –6 998 6. –2.0   0
999 6.60 –2.9 689  2
2000 8. –0. 98 09 2
200 .6 –.  9 6
2002 .86 –.92 8 29 8
200–0 .89 –2. ,96 ,80 66 200 .06 –. 298 9 0
(table continues next page)

table 2     the benefit to fDi stock from tax cuts, selected countries, 1982–2005 (continued)










































200 .88 –2.90 8 2    0
200 .0 –. 9 29    68
Total inward FDI stock gain from tax liberalization assuming 
tax cuts have a five–year effect on FDI flows (billions of dollars)
   
Total inward FDI stock gain from tax liberalization assuming tax 
cuts have a permanent effect on FDI flows (billions of dollars)
,8
  Total inward FDI stock in 982   $29 billion
  Total inward FDI stock in 200   $,998 billion
  Total inward FDI stock growth   $,69 billion
Note: The tax rates are a weighted average based on FDI inflows of the statutory corporate tax rates of the following countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. Collectively, these countries accounted for 0 percent of world FDI 
inflows in 982 and 6 percent of world inward FDI stock. In 200, these countries combined accounted for  percent of world FDI inflows and 60 percent of world inward FDI stock 
(UNCTAD FDI database).
Sources: Klemm (200); UNCTAD FDI database, 2008; authors’ calculations.
table 3   us outward fDi stock by industry, 1982–2006 (current US dollars in billions)
industry 1982 1987 1992 1997 2001 2006
All industries total 208 26 02 8 60 28
Petroleum related 8 6 9 8 89 
Food 6 0  2 2 
Beverages 2  6 2 2 
Tobacco products 2     
Chemicals 8 28  6 9 0
Machinery (nonelectrical)  29 28 0 8 2
Electronic and computer equipment and  
   products
 0 6  68 92
Transportation equipment  9 2 6 0 6
Primary and fabricated metals  6 0 6 22 2
Textiles and apparel  2 2   
Wood and wood products      6
Paper  6    
Plastics and rubber   6 0  
Nonmetallic mineral products 2   6  
Medical equipment      2
Miscellaneous manufacturing   2   6
Wholesale trade 2   6 08 6
Retail trade   9 2 2 60
Banking 0 8 2 8 6 68
Finance except banking –9  2 86 82 66
Insurance  2 9  8 9
Real estate  2 2   8
Holding companies 20  8 68 9 0
Agriculture services      
Mining (except oil and gas)   8 2 0 2
Utilities 0 0   26 
Communications 0 0    6
Construction     2 2
Transportation 2 2    
Hotels 0    8 9
Business services 2  0 29  9
Publishing services   2   
Motion pictures and television services   2   
Architecture and engineering services 0     2
Health services 0  0 0 0 
Legal services 0 0 0 0  2
Education services 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other services   6 8 2 69
Notes: Several entries are not disclosed by the data source. We extrapolate from the overall trend to fill in missing entries.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008.6
table 4  Growth calculations for us outward fDi stock by industry, 1982–2006  

































All industries total 20 96 2,89 2,8  ,26 6
Petroleum related 8 269  8 22 –26 –8
Food 6 28  2 22  20
Beverages 2 8   6 2 8
Tobacco products 2 9  –0  – <0
Chemicals 8 8 0 2 6  0
Machinery (nonelectrical)  6 2 8  –2 –0
Electronic and computer  
   equipment and products   92 8 2 8 69
Transportation equipment   6  0  0
Primary and fabricated  
   metals  2 2 8 20 –2 –
Textiles and apparel  6    –2 –6
Wood and wood products   6  2  60
Paper  9  6  –9 –
Plastics and rubber   6  0 2 –2 –
Nonmetallic mineral  
   products 2 9  2   8
Medical equipment    2 2  2 89
Miscellaneous   
   manufacturing   6   2 
Wholesale trade 2 9 6 0 6 6 6
Retail trade   60    6
Banking 0 8 68  8 9 
Finance except banking –9 0b 66  0  09
Insurance   9 2 2 8 6
Real estate   8 8 2 6 
Holding companies  20 9 0 69 2 69 90
Agriculture services  2  0 2 – –
Mining (except oil and gas)   2  2 –0 –69
(table continues next page)
table 4  Growth calculations for us outward fDi stock by industry, 1982–2006  

































Utilities 0 2   2 9 8
Communications 0  6 6 0 6 9
Construction   2   –2 –
Transportation 2 8   6  
Hotels 0 2 9 9 2  80
Business services  2 9 9 89  82 92
Publishing services  2  2 2 0 8
Motion pictures and  
   television services    6   8
Architecture and  
   engineering services 0 2 2 2 2 0 6
Health services 0 0   0  
Legal services 0 0 2 2 0 2 9
Education services 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Other services   69 66   8
a. Negative unexplained growth could reflect market forces or tighter policy, or it could simply reflect the low responsiveness of 
investment in this industry to economic growth. 
b. If the 982 FDI stock was negative we arbitrarily assume that the predicted 2006 level is zero.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008; International Monetary Fund, 2008; authors’ calculations.8
table 5     restrictiveness index for fDi policies from Golub (2003)  
                     ( = most restrictive)
type of restriction                   score
Foreign equity limits






No restriction but unbound 0.0
Screening and approval
Investor must show economic benefits 0.2
Approval unless contrary to national interest 0.
Notification (pre or post) 0.0
Other restrictions
Board of directors/managers
    Majority must be nationals or residents 0.
    At least  must be national or resident 0.0
    Must be locally licensed 0.02
Movement of people
    No entry 0.
    Less than one year 0.0
    One to two years 0.0
    Three to four years 0.02
Input and operational restrictions
    Domestic content must be more than 0 percent 0.
    Other 0.0
Total—Index rangea     Between 0 and 
a. If foreign equity is banned, then the other criteria become irrelevant, so that the index 
is at .0. It is possible that the various scores sum to slightly more than .0 when foreign 
equity is not totally banned, and in such cases, the index is capped at .0.
Source: Golub (200).9
table 6     average fDi restrictiveness indexes for 20 oeCD countries, 0 to 1 scale  
  ( = most restrictive)




Legal business services 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.0 0.0 –0.0
Accounting business services 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 –0.09
Architecture business services 0. 0. 0. 0.08 0.08 –0.06
Engineering business services 0. 0. 0. 0.09 0.09 –0.06
Total business services 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.0 –0.08
Fixed telecommunications 0.82 0.90 0.82 0. 0.20 –0.62
Mobile telecommunications 0.62 0.9 0.62 0. 0.2 –0.0
Total telecommunications 0. 0.8 0. 0.29 0.8 –0.9
Construction 0. 0.6 0. 0.08 0.08 –0.06
Distribution 0.9 0.20 0.9 0.2 0.2 –0.06
Insurance 0.2 0. 0.2 0. 0. –0.
Banking 0.0 0. 0.0 0. 0. –0.
Total finance 0.29 0.2 0.29 0. 0. –0.6
Tourism 0. 0. 0. 0.08 0.08 –0.06
Air transportation 0.6 0.6 0.6 0. 0.2 –0.
Maritime transportation 0. 0.9 0. 0.29 0.26 –0.
Road transportation 0. 0.8 0. 0.22 0. –0.0
Total transportation 0. 0.60 0. 0.0 0.2 –0.26
Electric utilities 0.9 0.80 0.9 0.2 0. –0.28
Manufacturing 0. 0.6 0. 0.08 0.08 –0.06
Notes: The included countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The index scores 
presented here are the simple averages of the individual countries’ indexes for each industry.
Sources: Golub (200); authors’ calculations.0
table 7     policy calculations for us outward fDi stock by industry, 1982–2006  

































All industries total 20 96 2,89 2,8  ,26 6
Banking 0 8 68  8 9 
Finance except banking –9 0b 66  0  09
Insurance   9 2 2 8 6
Utilities 0 2   2 9 8
Communications 0  6 6 0 6 9
Transportation 2 8   6  
Subtotal —Positively policy  
   affected industries
 9 9 8   88
Petroleum related 8 269  8 22 –26 –8
Subtotal —Negatively policy  
   affected industries
8 269  8 22 –26 –8
Total —Policy affected  
   industries
68 62 8 60 28 8 8
Share of unexplained FDI growth 












FDI growth explained by  
   world GDP growth
   
FDI growth explained by  
   policy liberalizationc   8 8
FDI growth explained by  
   “everything else”
,0 8
a. Negative unexplained growth could reflect market forces or tighter policy, or it could simply reflect the low responsiveness of 
investment in this industry to economic growth. 
b. If the 982 FDI stock was negative we would expect the 2006 level to be zero in 2006, not a larger negative amount. 
c. The two numbers differ because one is the policy share of total unexplained FDI growth (namely 2 percent), while the other is the 
policy share of all FDI growth over the period 982–2006 (namely 8 percent).
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008; International Monetary Fund, 2008; authors’ calculations.
table 8     us inward fDi stock by industry, 1982–2006 (current US dollars in billions)
industry 1982 1987 1992 1997 2001 2006
All industries total 2 260 28 680 9 8
Petroleum related 8 0 8 6 02 2
Food  6  6 9 22
Beverages  9   8 
Tobacco products 0 0 0 – 2 
Chemicals  26 2 90 29 8
Machinery (nonelectrical) 2 2 8   60
Electronic and computer equipment and products 6 2 20 6 08 69
Transportation equipment 2   8 62 69
Primary and fabricated metals  8 2  20 
Textiles and apparel 0     
Wood and wood products 0    2 
Paper  2    9
Plastics and rubber  0 2  9  6
Nonmetallic mineral products 2  8  28 8
Medical equipment  0 2    
Miscellaneous manufacturing    2 6 
Wholesale trade 8  60 8 6 8
Retail trade  8  6 2 
Banking 8  22 0 6 9
Finance except banking 0  0  69 00
Insurance 9 8  69 0 8
Real estate 2 22 2 0  
Holding companies  2   0 2 8
Agriculture services    2  2
Mining (except oil and gas) 2 6 9   9
Utilities 0   2 26 
Communications 0 0  6 6 
Construction   2   0
Transportation  2  9  
Hotels 0 2 2  2 2
Business services    8 2  08
Publishing services 2  0 2 20 28
Motion pictures and television services 0     2
Architecture and engineering services 0    2 8
Health services 0 0  6  9
Legal services 0 0 0 0 0 0
Education services 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other services 0     8
Notes: Several entries are not disclosed by the data source. We extrapolate from the overall trend to fill in missing entries.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008.2
table 9      Growth calculations for us inward fDi stock by industry, 1982–2006  






























All industries total 2 0 ,8 ,660 80 ,28 
Petroleum related 8 2 2 0  0 8
Food  2 22 9 9 0 2
Beverages    9  – –
Tobacco products 0 0   0  00
Chemicals  8 8 69  2 
Machinery (nonelectrical) 2 9 60 8   89
Electronic and computer  
   equipment and products
6 2 69 6 8 6 2
Transportation equipment 2 6 69 68  6 9
Primary and fabricated metals  2  29 6  6
Textiles and apparel 0   2   6
Wood and wood products 0     2 
Paper  6 9 8   
Plastics and rubber  0 2 6 6   9
Nonmetallic mineral products 2 9 8 6  9 8
Medical equipment  0 0   0  00
Miscellaneous manufacturing       
Wholesale trade 8  8 6   68
Retail trade  2  28 6 2 
Banking 8 2 9  2  8
Finance except banking 0 2 00 00  98 99
Insurance 9  8 9 26 2 82
Real estate 2   2  – –
Holding companies  2  8 9   9
Agriculture services   2   –2 –6
Mining (except oil and gas) 2 8 9  6  
Utilities 0 0   0  00
Communications 0   2   98
Construction   0   – –
Transportation    6   80
Hotels 0 2 2 2  2 9
Business services    08 08  0 98
(table continues next page)
table 9     Growth calculations for us inward fDi stock by industry, 1982–2006  






























Publishing services 2  28 26  2 80
Motion pictures and television  
   services
0  2 2  20 9
Architecture and engineering  
   services
0  8 8 0 8 9
Health services 0 0 9 9 0 8 9
Legal services 0 0 0  0 0 0 00
Education services 0 0 0 0 0 0 00
Other services 0  8   6 86
a. Negative unexplained growth could reflect market forces or tighter policy, or it could simply reflect the low responsiveness of 
investment in this industry to economic growth.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008; International Monetary Fund, 2008; authors’ calculations.
table 10     policy calculations for us inward fDi stock by industry, 1982–2006  




































All industries total 2 0 ,8 ,660 80 ,28 
Transportation  
   equipment
2 6 69 68  6 9
Banking 8 2 9  2  8
Finance except banking 0 2 00 00  98 99
Insurance 9  8 9 26 2 82
Utilities 0 0   0  00
Communications 0   2   98
Transportation    6   80
Subtotal —Positively  
   policy affected industries
20 80 82 62 60 02 89
Total—Policy affected  
   industries
20 80 82 62 60 02 89
Share of unexplained FDI growth 





share of total fDi 
growth (percent)
FDI growth explained by  
   US GDP growth
80 2
FDI growth explained by  
   policy liberalizationa 02 0
FDI growth explained by  
   “everything else”
9 
a. The two numbers differ because one is the policy share of total unexplained FDI growth (namely 9 percent), while the other is 
the policy share of all FDI growth over the period 982-2006 (namely 0 percent).
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008; International Monetary Fund, 2008; authors’ calculations.
table 11    policy calculations for us outward and inward fDi stock by industry, 1982–2006 















FDI growth in policy affected  
   sectors (billions of US dollars)
–22  0 
Share of unexplained FDI  
   growth attributed to FDI growth in policy affected  
   sectors  (percent)
n.a.a     26
US inward FDI
FDI growth in policy affected sectors (billions of US 
   dollars)
9 8  08
Share of unexplained FDI growth attributed to FDI  
   growth in policy affected sectors  (percent)
6 9  0  
 
a. After allowing for world GDP growth, the outward FDI stock in our identified policy affected sectors was less than expected.
Source: Authors’ calculations.6
table 12     us outward fDi stock by destination, 1982–2006 (current US dollars in billions)
Country 1982 1987 1992 1997 2001 2006
All countries total 208 26 02 8 ,60 2,8
Argentina     6 
Australia 9 2  28 28 2
Austria      
Bahamas    2 6 26
Barbados 0 0 0  2 
Belgium 6 8   2 2
Bermuda 2 9 2 8 8 08
Brazil 9  6 6 2 
Canada  9 69 9  26
Chile 0   9  0
China 0 0   2 22
Costa Rica 0 0 0 2 2 2
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0  
Denmark   2 2  6
Egypt  2  2  6
Finland 0 0 0  2 
France  2 2  0 66
Germany  2   6 99
Hong Kong   9  2 8
Hungary 0 0 0  2 
India 0 0 0 2 2 9
Indonesia 2     
Ireland 2 6 8  0 8
Israel    2 6 0
Italy  0  6 2 29
Japan 6 6 2  6 92
Korea    6 0 22
Luxembourg   2 0  8
Malaysia   2   2
Mexico    2  8
Netherlands  6 2 69 8 26
Netherlands Antilles –20 – –2  6 
New Zealand      6
Panama  6  22  6
Peru 2   2  
(table continues next page)
table 12     us outward fDi stock by destination, 1982–2006 (current US dollars in billions)  
  (continued)
Country 1982 1987 1992 1997 2001 2006
Philippines   2   
Poland 0 0 0   
Portugal 0     
Russia 0 0 0   0
Saudi Arabia  2 2   
Singapore 2   8  60
South Africa 2   2  
Spain 2  9 2 28 9
Sweden   2  26 6
Switzerland  20 29  6 90
Taiwan  2   9 6
Thailand     6 8
Trinidad and Tobago  0   2 
Turkey 0 0   2 2
United Arab Emirates   0   
United Kingdom 28 6 8  228 6
United Kingdom Islands     6 8
Venezuela  2 2  0 2
Other Africa     0 6
Other Asia and Pacific 2 2 2 2  
Other Caribbean  0 2   
Other Central America    2 2 2
Other Europe      28
Other Middle East  2    8
Other South America      6
Note: Entries for years with undisclosed data are extrapolated from the surrounding years.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008.8
table 13     Growth calculations for us outward fDi by destination, 1982–2006  
  (current US dollars in billions)
Country fDi, 1982
predicted 










All countries total 208 968 2,8 2,6 6 ,6 6
Argentina    0  6 
Australia 9  2  28 8 
Austria     2  88
Barbados 0 0   0  9
Belgium 6 2 2  9 2 9
Brazil 9 0  2 0 – –
Canada  80 26 20  66 
Chile 0 2 0 0 2 8 8
China 0 0 22 22 0 22 98
Costa Rica 0  2   0 28
Czech Republic 0 0   0  00
Denmark   6   0 8
Egypt   6    29
Finland 0   2  2 8
France  29 66 9 22  6
Germany  6 99 8 2 2 8
Hong Kong    8   2 60
Hungary 0 0   0  00
India 0 2 9 8   8
Indonesia 2 8  8   
Ireland 2 2 8 82 9 6 
Israel   0 9 2  
Italy  9 29 2  0 9
Japan 6 26 92 8 9 66 
Korea  8 22 22   66
Luxembourg  0 8 8 9  89
Malaysia   2   6 2
Mexico  22 8 80  6 9
Netherlands   26 209 2 8 88
New Zealand   6  2  
Panama  6 6   –0 –69
Peru 2     –2 –8
(table continues next page)9
table 13     Growth calculations for us outward fDi by destination, 1982–2006  
  (current US dollars in billions) (continued)
Country fDi, 1982
predicted 










Philippines    6   0
Poland 0 0   0  00
Portugal 0 2   2  
Russia** 0 0 0 0 0 0 00
Saudi Arabia     2  
Singapore 2  60 9  6 8
South Africa 2 8  2  – –20
Spain 2  9    
Sweden   6   2 92
Switzerland  8 90   2 
Taiwan   6 6  2 8
Thailand   8    
Trinidad and Tobago  2    2 6
Turkey 0  2 2   6
United Arab Emirates     2 2 
United Kingdom 28 6 6  08 228 68
Venezuela  6 2 9  6 6
Bahamas   26 2 8  6
Bermuda* 2  08 9 2  6
Netherlands Antilles* –20 0  2 0 2 00
United Kingdom  
   Islands*
  8 9   9
Other Africa*   6   2 
Other Asia and Pacific* 2    8 – –69
Other Caribbean*    2  – –9
Other Central America*   2   –2 –6
Other Europe*   28 2   
Other Middle East*   8   – –6
Other South America*  20 6  6 –2 –
*GDP growth of the world except the United States is used for this country. 
** Russian GDP from 982 to 99 is extrapolated from Polish GDP growth over the same time period.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008; International Monetary Fund, 2008; authors’ calculations.0
table 14     policy calculations for us outward fDi by destination, 1982–2006  





































All countries total 208 968 2,8 2,6 6 ,6 6
Argentina    0  6 
Bahamas   26 2 8  6
Bermudaa 2  08 9 2  6
Chile 0 2 0 0 2 8 8
China 0 0 22 22 0 22 98
Costa Rica 0  2   0 28
Czech Republic 0 0   0  00
Egypt   6    29
Hungary 0 0   0  00
India 0 2 9 8   8
Indonesia 2 8  8   
Ireland 2 2 8 82 9 6 
Japan 6 26 92 8 9 66 
Korea  8 22 22   66
Malaysia   2   6 2
Mexico  22 8 80  6 9
Netherlands Antillesa –20 0  2 0 2 00
Poland 0 0   0  00
Russiab 0 0 0 0 0 0 00
Thailand   8    
Turkey 0  2 2   6
United Kingdom Islandsa   8 9   9
Subtotal—Positively policy  
   affected countries
20 8 62 60 6 6 6
Brazil 9 0  2 0 – –
Peru 2     –2 –8
Other Central Americaa,c   2   –2 –6
Subtotal—Negatively  
   policy affected countries
2 62 0 28 9 –22 –8
Total—Policy affected  
   countries
2 2 66 629 9  69
Share of unexplained FDI growth 
attributed to FDI growth in policy 
affected countriesd

(table continues next page)
table 14     policy calculations for us outward fDi by destination, 1982–2006  




share of total fDi 
growth (percent)
FDI growth explained by country–specific GDP  growth 6 
FDI growth explained by policy liberalizationd  20
FDI growth explained by  “everything else” 98 
a. GDP growth of the world except the United States is used for this country. 
b. Russian GDP from 982 to 99 is extrapolated from Polish GDP growth over the same time period. 
c. “Other” refers to Central American countries not listed in table . 
d. See note “c”  in table  and note “a” in table 0.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008; International Monetary Fund, 2008; authors’ calculations.2
table 15     fDi restrictiveness index from agosin and Machado (2007) ( = most open, 0 = least open)
Country 1990 1996 2002 Country 1990 1996 2002
Algeria    Latvia —  
Angola  2 2 Lebanon   
Argentina    Lesotho   
Armenia —   Lithuania — 2 
Australia 2 2  Madagascar   
Austria    Malaysia 0  2
Azerbaijan —   Mauritius   
Bangladesh 2   Mexico   
Belarus — 2 2 Moldova —  
Belgium    Mongolia —  
Benin 0 0 0 Mozambique   
Bolivia    Namibia —  
Brazil 0  2 Nepal   
Bulgaria —   Netherlands   
Burkina Faso  0  New Zealand   2
Cambodia 0   Nicaragua   
Cameroon    Nigeria 2 2 
Canada    Norway   
Central African  
   Republic
   Pakistan   
Chad  2  Panama   
Chile    Paraguay   
China  2 2 Peru 2  
Colombia 0   Philippines 2  
Congo 2   Poland 2  
Costa Rica    Portugal   
Cote d’Ivoire 2   Romania   
Croatia — 2  Russia — 2 
Czech Republic —   Senegal   
Denmark    Singapore   
Dominican  
   Republic
   Slovakia —  
Ecuador    Slovenia —  
Egypt 2   South Africa   
El Salvador    Spain 2  
Estonia —   Sri Lanka 2  
Ethiopia 0 2 2 Sweden   
Finland    Switzerland 0  
France 2   Syria   
(table continues next page)
table 15  fDi restrictiveness index from agosin and Machado (2007) ( = most open, 0 = least open) 
   (continued)
Country 1990 1996 2002 Country 1990 1996 2002
Gabon  2  Tajikistan —  
Germany    Thailand   
Ghana 0  2 Togo   
Greece 2   Trinidad and  
   Tobago
  
Guatemala    Tunisia   
Guinea 2   Turkey 2 2 
Haiti    Turkmenistan — 2 2
Honduras    Uganda 0  
Hong Kong    Ukraine 0  
Hungary    United Kingdom   
India 0 0 0 United States   
Indonesia 0  2 Uruguay   
Ireland    Uzbekistan —  
Israel    Venezuela 2  
Italy    Vietnam  2 
Jamaica    Yemen   
Japan 2 2  Zambia 2  
Kenya    Zimbabwe   
Korea   
— = missing data.
Source: Agosin and Machado (200).

table 16     unCtaD database of “more” or  “less” favorable fDi policy changes, 1992–2006
Country More Less net Country More Less net Country More Less net
Afghanistan  0  Cape Verde  0  Gambia 0  –
Albania 6 0 6 Cayman Islands  0  Georgia 0  9
Algeria 9 2  Central African Republic   0 Germany 9  
Angola   2 Chile 8 8 0 Ghana   0
Anguilla 0  – China 8 0 8 Greece 2 0 2
Antigua and Barbuda   2 Colombia 22 0 22 Guam 2 0 2
Argentina 8 2 6 Comoros  0  Guatemala   6
Armenia 9 0 9 Congo 6 0 6 Guinea  0 
Australia 2  2 Congo, DR  0  Guyana  0 
Austria 2 0 2 Cook Islands  0  Honduras  0 
Azerbaijan 8 2 6 Costa Rica 6 0 6 Hong Kong 6 0 6
Bahamas 6 2  Côte d’ Ivoire  0  Hungary   28
Bahrain 6 0 6 Croatia    Iceland 2 0 2
Bangladesh  0  Cuba 2 2 0 India 60  9
Barbados 9 0 9 Cyprus   0 Indonesia   
Belarus  2 2 Czech Republic 8 0 8 Iran 2  20
Belgium 2 0 2 Denmark 6 2  Iraq 6 0 6
Belize  0  Djibouti   2 Ireland   
Benin 0  – Dominican Republic    Israel  2 
Bolivia   0 Ecuador 8   Italy   
Bosnia and Herzegovina    Egypt 9   Jamaica  0 
Botswana 8   El Salvador  0  Japan   
Brazil 6   Equatorial Guinea 0 2 -2 Jordan  0 
Brunei Darussalam  0  Eritrea   2 Kazakhstan   9
Bulgaria 6   Estonia 2 2 0 Kenya  2 
Burkina Faso 6 0 6 Ethiopia 20 0 20 Korea, North  0 
Burundi 6 0 6 Fiji  0  Korea, South 9 2 
Cambodia    Finland  0  Kuwait  0 
Cameroon  0  France 20   Kyrgyzstan 2  
Canada 2 0 2 Gabon  0  Laos  0 
(table continues next page)

table 16     unCtaD database of “more” or  “less” favorable fDi policy changes, 1992–2006 (continued)
Country More Less net Country More Less net Country More Less net
Latvia  2 2 Pakistan 9  8 Suriname  0 
Lebanon 9 0 9 Panama   0 Sweden  0 
Liberia 0  - Papua New Guinea  0  Switzerland   
Libya  2  Paraguay 2 0 2 Syria   2
Lithuania  2 9 Peru 9  6 Taiwan  2 
Luxembourg  0  Philippines   0 Tajikistan 2  
Macedonia  0  Poland 2  2 Tanzania 0 0 0
Madagascar 6 0 6 Portugal 26  2 Thailand 29  26
Malawi   2  Puerto Rico   0  Timor-Leste  0 
Malaysia  0  Qatar 0  9 Trinidad and Tobago  0 
Mali  0  Romania   0 Tunisia 9 0 9
Malta  0  Russia  8 9 Turkey   
Mauritania   6 Rwanda  0  Turkmenistan  0 
Mauritius 2  20 Saint Kitts and Nevis 6 0 6 Uganda  0 
Mexico 20 0 20 Saint Lucia 2 0 2 Ukraine 2 2 2
Moldova 2  9 Saint Vincent   0  United Arab Emirates   
Mongolia 6   Samoa 2 0 2 United Kingdom 6 2 
Morocco 2 0 2 São Tome and Principe  0  United States 8  
Mozambique   6 Saudi Arabia 26  2 Uruguay 2 2 0
Myanmar  0  Senegal  0  Uzbekistan 29 0 29
Namibia  0  Serbia and Montenegro 20 0 20 Vanuatu 2 0 2
Nepal  0  Seychelles 2  9 Venezuela  0 
Netherlands  0  Sierra Leone  0  Vietnam   0
New Zealand 9 2  Singapore 2 2 2 Yemen  0 
Nicaragua 8   Slovakia   9 Yugoslavia (former)   
Niger  0  Slovenia 0 0 0 Zambia 2  
Nigeria 6 2  South Africa 26  2 Zimbabwe   0
Norway  0  Spain 2 0 2 World 2,28 22 ,99
Oceania  0  Sri Lanka 6  
Oman 6   Sudan  0 
Source: UNCTAD (2008b).6
table 17     policy calculations for us outward fDi stock by country and by industry, 1982–2006  















FDI growth in policy affected sectors  
   (billions of current US dollars)
–0 0  2
Share of unexplained FDI growth  
   attributed to FDI growth in policy  
   affected sectors (percent)
n.a.a 2 2 29
Industry analysis
FDI growth in policy affected sectors  
   (billions of current US dollars)
–22  0 
Share of unexplained FDI growth  
   attributed to FDI growth in policy  
   affected sectors (percent)
n.a.a   26
a. After allowing for world or country-specific GDP growth, the outward FDI stock in our identified policy affected sectors or countries 
was less than expected.
Source: Authors’ calculations.






















of current US 
dollars)





982 29 0.9 2.2 208 2 
98 2 0.90 9.8 22 20 
98  0.90 0.9 28 2 2
98  0.8 8.2 28 20 
986  0.8 6. 20  9
98 6 0.98 6. 26 22 2
988 8 . .6  2 2
989 62 . 8. 82  29
990 66 . .89   2
99 9 0.98 .86 68 2 
992 8 0.9 .89 02 20 8
99 6 .0 . 6 9 8
99  .09 .2 6  
99 9 .29 .9 699 2 
996 0 . .2 9  9
99  .9 .6 8 9 66
998 0 .9 .0 ,00  
999 2 .2 .08 ,26 62 0
2000 2 . 6. ,6 80 
200 29 .2 .9 ,60  8
2002 6 .9 2.00 ,6 2 
200 86 .0 .2 ,0 22 6
200 29 2.0 .89 2,2 0 99
200 269 2. .62 2,  92
2006 0 2. .9 2,8 8 92
Addenda:
total growth 
















982–2006 88 8 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008; Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 20088






attributable to  
“market forces plus 
technology” total gains
a. Parsing the growth in US inward and outward FDI stock, 982–2006 (billions of dollars)
Total inward FDI stock gain 
   (share of total gain in 









Total outward FDI stock gain 
   (share of total gain in 









b. Annual gain to US GDP in 2006 from US inward and outward FDI stock growth, 982–2006 (billions of dollars)
Gain from inward stock  
   growthb
  22 6
Gain from outward stock  
   growthc
66  90 88
Total gain to US GDP  8 2 2
a. When considering inward stock growth US GDP growth is used; when considering outward stock growth the GDP growth of the 
world except the United States is used.  
b. Estimates made using the Keller and Yeaple (200) approach. 
c.  Estimates drawn from direct investment income receipts of US–based multinational enterprises.
Source: Authors’ calculations.